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NOTES
ELISORS AND THE] RELUCTANT SHERIFF
"If the sheriff be not an indifferent person; as if he be a party
in the suit, or be related by either blood or affinity to either of
the parties, he is not then trusted to return the jury, but the
venire shall be directed to the coroners ....If any exception lies
to the coroners, the venire shall be directed to two clerks of the
court, or two persons of the county named by the court, and
sworn. These two ...are called elisors .... 1
In these words Sir William Blackstone expressed the common law
of elisors as well as a digested prediction of the present law of elisors
in contemporary jurisdictions. Then, as now, the appointment of an
elisor was merely an exercise of a right by a court to assure service of
its process when those ordinarily responsible for performing this
2
function were disqualified.
I.

ELISORS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

At Common Law. The English law of elisors was developed solely
by the courts, there being no English statutory provisions for the
appointment of such persons. A case which was reported in the last
half of the sixteenth century held that, in counties having only one
sheriff but several coroners, any disinterested coroner might properly
serve the venire facias when the sheriff was interested in the cause. 8
A subsequent case held that in those counties having co-sheriffs4 the
disqualification of one sheriff did not disqualify the other. 5 Shortly
before Blackstone commenced publishing his Commentaries6 the Court
of Common Pleas ruled that, when the sheriff and coroners were all
13
2

BL. COMM. **354,

See

355.

FLA. STAT. §47.12 (1949),

quoted in part infra p. 200.

3Wimbish v. Willoghby, 1 Plow. 73, 75 Eng. Rep. 116 (K.B.
4

1552).
Several English counties, among them London County, bad two sheriffs,

each with concurrent powers.
5Rich v. Player, 2 Show. 262, 89 Eng. Rep. 929, arrest of judgment denied,
2 Show. 286, 89 Eng. Rep. 943 (K.B. 1695); Rich v. Player, Skin. 104, 90 Eng.
Rep. 49 (K.B. 1695).
6
These were published in four volumes over the 4-year period 1761-1765.

(194)
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interested in a cause to be tried, the proper person to empanel the
7
jury was an "elizor".
In Andrews v. Sharp8 the trial court directed the coroners to serve
a writ of attachment on the sheriff. The coroners having declined to
make service, the court appointed elisors to serve writs of attachment
on the recalcitrant coroners. On appeal, the King's Bench Division
approved the method of service in this case, and later followed this
precedent 9 in a subsequent case presenting almost identical facts.10
In 1831 the Court of Common Pleas approved the appointment of an
elisor to empanel a jury in a case in which the sheriff and all the
coroners were officials of the plaintiff municipal corporation."
12
Halsbury sums up the English case-law of elisors by stating:
"When... the sheriff... and.., all the coroners be... interested, process is directed to elisors approved by the court or its
officer."
In Other States. Most of the states provide by statute for the
appointment of elisors,' 3 although not always by that name. There is
7Holland v. Herron, Barnes 465, 94 Eng. Rep. 1006 (K.B. 1754). 'Elizor" is
the old English spelling, discarded for "elisor" at about the time of the American
Revolution.
82 Black. W. 911, 96 Eng. Rep. 538 (K.B. 1773).
9Ibid., i.e., when the sheriff and all the coroners are interested or otherwise
disqualified, the proper person to serve process is an elisor.
'0 The King v. Peckham and Clarke, 2 Black. W. 1218, 96 Eng. Rep. 716

(K.B. 1778).
"Mayor and Corp. of.Norwich v. Gill, 8 Bing. 27, 131 Eng. Rep. 310 (C.P.
1831).
127 HALSBunry, LAws or ENGLAND 642, 64 (2d ed., Hailsham 1937).
13ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §174 (1940); Ajuz. CODE ANN. §17-608 (1939);
ARE. STAT. ANN. §27-327 (1947); CAL. CODE Crv. Pnoc. ANN. §410 (1949);
COLO. STAT. ANN. c. 45, §120 (Cum. Supp. 1949); CoNN. Gm. STAT. §7771

§47.12 (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. §31-2218 (1947); ILL.
§6 (1933); IND. ANN. STAT. §§4-322, 4-323 (Bums 1946);
IowA RuLEs OF Civ. Poc. 52 (1946); KAN. GE. STAT. ANN. §61-1401 (1935);
Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §70.200 (Cum. Supp. 1948); LA. GEr. STAT. AN. §7593
(1939); MD. ANN. CODE GCE. LAws art. 75, §§178, 179 (1939); MICH. Comp.
(1949); FLA. STAT.
Civ. PRAc. AcT ANN.

STAT. §593.12 (Henderson 1945); Miss.
LAws §14086 (Mason 1929); Mn.
CODE ANN. §§1663, 3906 (1942); Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. §12832 (1939); MoNT.
REV. CODES ANN. §16-2721 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. §25-2202 (1943); NEv.
Comp. LAws ANN. §9042 (1929); N. J. REv. STAT. §40:41-22 (1937); N. M.
STAT. ANN. §22-214 (1941); N. Y. muD. LAW §747; N. C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
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no commonly used synonym for elisor, the variant terminology ranging
from "suitable and discreet person"14 to

"crier

; 5 but by whatever

called 16

name they are
they have a common purpose, namely, the
empaneling of juries or the serving of process in the event of absence,
interest or reluctance of the regularly constituted sheriffs, constables,
coroners, marshals or sergeants to perform their duties. Some statutes
explain at length the circumstances under which an elisor may properly be appointed, listing his authority, his privileges and his duties;' 7
while others merely authorize the appointment and assume a general
knowledge of the common law pertaining to him.' 8
In those few states that apparently preclude the use of elisors as
such,' 9 the statutes provide for so many alternative officers to serve
process or empanel juries that as a practical matter it is highly improbable that all of these officers would ever be simultaneously disqualified;20 and accordingly there is no real need for the appointment
§152-8 (1943); N. D. Rzv. CODE §28-0619 (1948); Omo GEN. CODE ANN.
§2835 (1937); OnE. COMP. LAws ANN. §15-401 (1947); PA. STAT. tit. 17, §1150
(Purdon 1930); S. D. CODE §12.1101 (1939); TEx. STAT., REV. Cry. art. 2355
(Vernon 1948); UTAH REv. STAT. §105-57-52 (1933); VT. REv. STAT. §1541
(1947); VA. CODE ANN. §15-512 (1950); WASH. REV. STAT. ANN. §225 (Remington 1932); W. VA. CODE ANN. §5586 (1943); Wis. STAT. §59.36 (1947);
Wyo. COMP. STAT. ANN. §14-209 (1945).
14
UTAH REv. STAT. §105-57-52 (1933).
15
VA. CODE ANN. §15-512 (1950).
16Of the 39 states listed in note 13 supra, 27 use some term other than elisor.
17E.g., NEv. CoMP. LAws ANN. §9042 (1929):
"Process and orders in an action or proceeding may be executed in any
county in this state by a person designated by the court, or the judge
thereof, of the county in which the action and proceeding is pending, and

denominated an elisor, in the following cases: (1) When the sheriff is a
party (2) When there is a vacancy in the office of the sheriff (3) When
it shall be made to appear, by affidavit, to the satisfaction of the court in
which the suit or proceeding is pending, or the judge thereof, that the
sheriff, by reason of any bias, prejudice, or other cause, would not act
promptly or impartially; provided, said court or judge may require such
person so appointed to give a bond, with sufficient security, in such
amount and with such condition, to the person to be served, as the court
or judge may deem necessary to secure the rights of the party."
8
1 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §7771 (1949): "All process shall be directed to
the sheriff, his deputy, a constable, or other proper officer, or to some indifferent
person ....

19 Delaware, Georgia, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Oklahoma,
Rhode
Island, South Carolina, and Tennessee.
20
GA. CODE ANN. §§81-203, 81-219 (1947), which together permit "any

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss2/3
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of elisors. It is significant, however, that, although elisors as such are
virtually eliminated in such states, full attention has been accorded
the reason for elisors, namely, the assurance to the courts of orderly
service of process and of proper initiation of trials.
In instances of statutory authorization of judicial appointment of
elisors, 21 the courts have followed the logical pattern of this segment
of the common law. There is some dispute as to whether the attorney
for plaintiff is sufficiently disinterested to serve process on the defendant;22 but the common law concept of elisors at least suggests
that an attorney in a cause ought not to serve process. It may reasonably be inferred from the statutes and cases of all the jurisdictions
except one that disqualification of the sheriff disqualifies his deputies
also. West Virginia does permit service upon a disqualified sheriff
by one of his deputies or by any "credible person; 23 but even so, the
cases in that jurisdiction favor service by a "credible person."24
Most of the states confine by statute the appointment of an elisor
to instances in which the sheriff is disqualified. Although some do not
express this limitation specifically, 25 their respective courts have read
it into the statutes. 26 Furthermore, neither party can procure the
appointment merely for the asking, but must satisfy the court of the
necessity therbfor, either orally or by affidavit. In the following types
of instances the sheriff has been held disqualified: when he is a party
constable or bailiff of any court" or "the sheriff of the adjoining counties" to
serve process when the sheriff is a party to an action in his own county.
21

See note 13 supra.

22

Plaintiffs attorney was held qualified to serve process in: Sheehan v. All
Persons, 80 CaL App. 393, 252 Pac. 337 (1926); Erdman v. Hardesty, 14 Colo.
App. 395, 60 Pac. 360 (1900); Whitewater First Nat. Bank v. Estenson, 68
Minn. 28, 70 N.W. 775 (1897); Meihl v. South Central Sec. Co., 227 Mo. App.
788, 58 S.W.2d 1011 (1933); Cooksey v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 17 Mo.
App. 132 (1885). Plaintiffs attorney held not qualified to serve process in:
Rutherford v. Moody, 59 Ark. 328, 27 S.W. 230 (1894); Nelson v. Chittenden,
23 Colo. App. 123, 127 Pac. 923 (1912); Nevada Cornell Silver Mines, Inc. v.
Hanldn, 51 Nev. 420, 279 Pac. 27 (1929). See 3 So. CALIF. L. REv. 129 (1929).
23W. VA. CODE ANN. §5536 (1943).
24
Hansford v. Tate, 61 W. Va. 207, 56 S.E. 372 (1907); Hollandsworth v.
Stone, 47 W. Va. 773, 35 S.E. 864 (1900); Peck v. Chambers, 44 W. Va. 270,
28 S.E. 706 (1897).
25
E.g., Arkansas, California, Colorado.
26McCabe v. Payne, 37 Ark. 450 (1881); People v. Nakis, 184 Cal. 105, 193
Pac. 92 (1920); Nelson v. Chittenden, 23 Colo. App. 123, 127 Pac. 923 (1912).
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to the action, 27 when he is related to any of the parties by affinity or
consanguinity, 28 when he is shown to be prejudiced against one of
the parties, 29 or when he has already refused to serve process directed
30
to him in the same cause.
In Federal Courts. The Judiciary Act of 1789 provides, in the
federal courts, that: 3 1
"... in all causes wherein the marshal or his deputy shall be a
party, the writs and precepts therein shall be directed to such
disinterested person as the court, or any justice or judge thereof
may appoint, and the person so appointed, is hereby authorized
to execute and return the same."
At no time has Congress withdrawn this authority; rather, it expanded
the provision in the revised Judiciary Act of 1911:32

"Writs of venire facias . .. shall be served ... by the marshal
.. . or by his deputy; or, in case the marshal or his deputy is
not an indifferent person, or is interested in the event of the
cause, by such fit person as may be specially appointed for that
purpose by the court. .. "
The current federal statutes 33 alter only the phrasing of the authority
found in these two earlier statutes, and preserve for the courts their
right to appoint elisors whenever the marshal is disqualified.
Furthermore, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in
34
1938, provide:
"Service of all process shall be made by a United States mar27

Lewis v. Cunningham, 10 Ariz. 158, 85 Pac. 244 (1906); Hillyer v. Pearson,
118 Ga. 815, 45 S.E. 701 (1903); Webster v. Smith, 78 Mo. 163 (188.3).
28
Allen v. Commonwealth, 8 Ky. Law Rep. 353, 12 S.W. 582 (1889).
29
State v. Hultz, 106 Mo. 41, 16 S.W. 940 ('1891).
BOStegall v. American Pigment & Chemical Co., 150 Mo. App. 251, 130 S.W.

144 (1910).
311 STAT.

87 (1789).

3236 STAT. 1165 (1911), 28 U.S.C. §416 (1946).
3362 STAT. 869, 953, 28 U.S.C.A. §1868 (Supp. 1948).
34

FED. R. Crv. P. 4(c).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss2/3
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shal, by his deputy, or by some person specially appointed by
the court for that purpose .... Special appointments to serve
process shall be made freely when substantial savings in travel
fees will result"
A special process-server located near the defendant has been appointed
at the request of the receiver of a bankrupt estate, in order to avoid
incurring transportation expenses of the marshal.3 5 Both William D.
Mitchell and Edson R. Sunderland have pointed out that this provision
authorizes the federal- courts to appoint process-servers as- a means
of saving the money of the litigants and the time of the marshal,
without, however, upsetting the authority already enjoyed by the
courts to appoint elisors, as distinct from the statutory process-server,
when the marshal is disqualified. 30
The federal courts have made only one noticeable departure from
the common law of elisors. The English cases emphasize the importance of the elisor when service is to be made upon a government
official who, but for his disqualification, would serve the process himself. In 1862, however, a federal district court held that, although
an elisor might properly serve a private person with process, service
by an elisor on a marshal, even though the latter was a party, was
invalid.32 This decision, unfortunately, was not appealed; nor has it
been overruled. It is highly illogical in that it suggests that as long
as a man is a United States marshal he cannot be served with process;
and yet it is precisely when the marshal himself is to be served that
the greatest need for an elisor arises.
In other respects the federal decisions are in line with the American
state and English decisions regarding elisors. Appointment is necessary; without it even a sheriff or a deputy sheriff is not empowered
to serve federal process.38 Although the attorney for a party is not a
3

51n re Evanishyn, 1 F.R.D. 202, 1 F.R.S. 4c.22, case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
6Mitchell, Some of the Problems Confronting the Advisory Committee in
Recent Months - Commencement of Action - Effect of Findings of Fact in Cases
Tried by Court Instead of Jury, Etc., 23 A.B.A.J. 966, 967 (1937); 'Sunderland,
New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as Related to judicial Procedure in Ohio,
oF Cm.L. Exv. 19, 22 (1939).
13 U.
3
2Ex parte Benedict, 3 Fed. Cas. 159, No. 1, 292 (N.D.N.Y. 1862).
38Knox & Crawford v. Summers & Thomas, 3 Cranch 496 (U.S. 1806); Dehne
v. Hillman Iv. Co., 110 F.2d 456 (3d Cir. 1940); Modric v. Oregon & N.W.R.R.,
25 F. Supp. 79 (D. Ore. 1938); Barnes v. Western Union Tel. Co., 120 Fed. 550
(N.E.D. Ca. 1903).
3
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proper person to serve process, 39 his suggestion as to who shall be
appointed is usually followed as long as such person is qualified. 40
Selection of talesmen by a marshal does not make him so interested
in the case as to necessitate appointment of an elisor to empanel a
jury; 4I but a marshal who had privately hired an investigator to obtain
facts about gambling in his territory has been held too interested to
select the venire from which to make up a jury to try the gamblers,
42
and accordingly an elisor was appointed to select the venire.
In Florida. For over a century the statutes of Florida have authorized our courts to appoint elisors 43 and have provided for their
compensation. 4 4 At present the courts have two sources of authority
45
for appointing elisors. The statutory provision is:
"A justice of the peace or constable, in the respective counties,
may serve all process in cases where the sheriff is interested, and
in case of necessity the judge of the circuit court may appoint
an elisor to act instead of the sheriff . .. ."
4
More recently, our new Common Law Rules state: "

"Service of process may be made by any officer authorized by
law to serve process; but if such officer shall, for any reason, be
disqualified or unable to act, the Court may appoint any competent person not interested in the case on trial to serve such

process ....
It is interesting to note that one of the later drafts47 of the new Florida
391n re Evanishyn, 1 F.R.D. 202, 1 F.R.S. 4c.22, case 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). See
note 22 supra.
40
Modric v. Oregon & N.W.R.R., 25 F. Supp. 79 (D. Ore. 1938).
41
Cravens v. United States, 62 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1932).
42
johnson v. United States, 247 Fed. 92 (9th Cir. 1917).
43
Fla. Laws 1845, c. 4, §16; THOMPSON's DIGEsT OF THE STATUTE LAW OF THE
STATE OF FLORIDA, Div. I, tit. II, c.IV, §3(4) (1847).
44
Fla. Laws 1846, c. 73, §1; THoM'soN op. cit. supra note 43, Div. Ill, tit. IV,
c. II, §7(1) (1847).
45
FLA. STAT. §47.12 (1949). Compensation is the same as that provided for
the sheriff.
46

47

FLA.

C.L.R. 5(c).

Proposed FloridaCommon Law Court Rules, 41 So.2d No. 4 Advance Sheets
(Aug. 25, 1949).
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Common Law Rules followed the federal procedure in providing for
the process-server also; but this proposal was ultimately rejected for
fear of transgressing .. . upon the perquisites of the sheriffs office." 48
There are no Florida decisions defining the general phrase "case
of necessity"; accordingly, a Florida judge faced with a request for
the appointment of an elisor will have to formulate for himself the
factual conditions that constitute "necessity." Viewed from another
angle, the Florida opinions are also silent as to precisely what disqualifies the sheriff or constable, or renders him unable to act. Nevertheless the general common and statute law of England in effect July
4, 1776, unless inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States or of Florida, is in effect today.49 Furthermore, our
courts also have the benefit of the few decisions rendered in those
jurisdictions in whi'ch the courts have been given the same loosely
defined authority that the Florida courts possess.50
In the preceding century the Florida Supreme Court ruled that a
deputy cannot serve his sheriff with process;5 1 when the sheriff is a
party, process is properly served by a' coroner or an elisor. Since
Florida today has no coroners52 as such, 53 "constable" or "justice of
the peace", in some respects similar to a coroner,54 would be the
proper terms to substitute for "coroner" in that early opinion. Later
the Court stated that a justice of the peace or an elisor may properly
serve the process of the circuit court when the sheriff is not qualified,
but that a municipal policeman is not as such empowered to make
valid service. 55 These two cases contain all the judicial expression
emanating from the Florida Supreme Court on the use of elisors in
48Wigginton, New Florida Common Law Rules, 3 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 1,
(1950).
5 n.19
4
PFLA. STAT. §2.01 (1949). For a discussion of the evolution of Florida law
see 50Legis., 3 U. oF FLA. L. REv. 74 (1950).
FLA. STAT. §47.12 (1949); FLA. C. L. R. 5(c); see note 18 supra for states
that authorize their courts to appoint elisors.
51
Seedhouse v. Broward, 34 Fla. 509, 16 So. 425 (1894).
52
FLA. STAT. §§936.01, 936.03 (1949).
53
Board of Rev, of Jefferson County v: State ex rel. Wiley, 199 Ala. 260, 74
So. 364 (1917); State ex rel. Mahon v. Cary, 143 Fla. 330, 196 So. 694 (1940);
1 BL.
Co.r. *348, 349; 2 BAC. A~n. 424 (1846).
54
FLA. STAT. §§936.01, 936.03 (1949).
5
GState ex rel. Price v. Stone, 128 Fla. 637,. 175 So. 229 (1937). He could
presumably be appointed elisor, but he would not then be acting as policeman.
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civil proceedings; and the occasional appointments by the circuit
judges have not, of course, been reported.
II.

ELsoRs IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

English cases do not expressly either grant or deny the courts
authority to appoint an elisor to serve a warrant for arrest or for
search and seizure when the sheriff, the coroner, and the constable
are disqualified. Federal and state decisions are also lacking. Alabama
and Kansas permit appointment of elisors in criminal cases. 5 Those
jurisdictions that authorize by statute the appointment of elisors
usually do so in chapters dealing with juries, rules of civil procedure,
commencement of actions, and cognate subjects." The few criminal
cases dealing with elisors relate to appointment solely for the purpose
of empaneling a jury.58 Nevertheless, it is difficult to believe that
the judiciary can effectively arrange for a jury and can independently
enforce service of civil process for the protection of the rights of one
individual, while at the same time lacking authority to secure service
of warrants for arrest or for search and seizure in its task of protecting
the entire community from the ill effects of misfeasance or nonfeasance
of a reluctant sheriff. A strong case is made for the existence of a
power inherent in our courts to provide an effective substitute in such
instances.
In Florida the courts are specifically charged with administering
remedies by due course of law.6 9 Yet a court unable to enforce its
decisions is little if any better than no court at all. Admittedly the
Florida judiciary is forbidden to exercise powers appertaining to the
legislative or executive branches of our government; 60 but, if a sheriff
becomes derelict in the performance of a function purely ancillary
to the judicial process, it by no means follows that the judiciary is
usurping his powers when it employs other means requisite to the
continued performance of its own function. The arrest of violators
56

ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §174 (1940); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §61-1401
(1935): "A justice of the peace may appoint a constable or constables for special
purposes, either in civil or criminal cases ..
57
See note 13 supra.
58
People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 49 Pac. 1049 (1897); Alien v. Commonwealth, 11 Ky. Law Rep. 555, 12 S.W. 582 (1889).
59
FLA. CONST. Dec]. of Rights, §4.
60
FLA. CONST. Art II; see State v. Atlantic C.L.R.R., 56 Fla. 617, 633, 47

So. 969, 975 (1908).
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of our criminal law and the seizure of property being used for unlawful purposes are basic in Anglo-American criminal procedure.
In many ways the sheriff is the most important administrative
officer of his county. He has authority to appoint deputies when the
volume of his work results in a need for assistance. 61 Perhaps the
distinctive feature of his office is that malfeasance or misfeasance are
not the primary causes of breakdown in law enforcement; mere neglect of duty on his part affords the criminal relative freedom of action.
The statutory provision for a fine of not over $100 or imprisonment
for not more than ten days for "willfully" failing and refusing to
perform his duty6 2 is hardly a source of pressure on the sheriff when
illegal activities produce, in the estimate of a prominent judge in
Dade County,0 3 a minimum of $100,000,000 a year in that one county,
and when other populous counties have for years, as a matter of
common knowledge, tolerated illegal gambling on a major scale. In
the face of these conilitions the presumption is prone to arise that the
sheriff has a lucrative interest in these prolonged violations of the law.
The presumption may not be correct; but its mere existence tends to
produce popular disrespect for all law and government in the area.
The Governor of Florida has authority to act in cases of malfeasance
or neglect of duty on the part of a sheriff; but the permissible action
is drastic and therefore is not frequently taken. Broadly speaking, the
Governor can recommend to the Senate, when it is in session, removal
of the sheriff from office; when the Senate is not in session he can
suspend the sheriff, although the latter may resume his duties at the
adjournment of the next session of the Senate unless it removes him.8 4
The vacancy created permanently by removal or temporarily by suspension can be filled by the Governor under his appointive power.65
Unless he takes this serious step, however, the performance of the
judicial function is completely paralyzed at its very outset; and the
appointment of an elisor to serve warrants for arrest and for search
61
FLA. STAT.
62

§30.07 (1949).

FrA. CONST. Art. XVI, §18; FLA. STAT. §925.01 (1949).

3
0 Circuit Judge Stanley Milledge ". . . told the jurors that racketeers were
taking a $100,000,000 yearly profit out of Dade County alone. He estimated that
$24,000,000 was set aside as 'ice money.' . . . He defined 'ice money' as 'all

sorts of expenses which legitimate business finds unnecessary."' Corner's, Mar. 25,
1950, p. 78, col., 2.
64
FLA. CoNST. Art. IV, §15. A thorough analysis is set forth in the opinion of
Terrell,
J., in State ex rel. Hardie v. Coleman, 115 Fla. 119, 155 So. 129 (1934).
65 FLA. CONST. Art. IV, §7.
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and seizure becomes essential.
From a somewhat different angle, it is also apparent that, when
a reluctant sheriff realizes that the circuit court can move against
criminals through the appointment of an elisor, he will be far less
inclined to favor them with apathy to enforcement of the law; the
mere existence of a check against possible abuses of office serves to
reduce their amount.
In 1948 a state attorney of Florida submitted to a circuit judge in
Volusia County an affidavit for a warrant of search and seizure which
included a request for appointment of an elisor to serve the warrant.
The reasons for the requested appointment are not in the transcript
of record, as they were expressed to the judge orally and ex parte.
The request was granted; 66 the elisor served the warrant and seized
numerous gambling devices found on the premises described in the
warrant; and the owner of the gambling house and of the seized
devices was then promptly arrested on a warrant served by the
sheriff. The motion of counsel for the accused to quash both the
search warrant and the order appointing the elisor was denied after
oral argument, 67 whereupon he promptly filed a petition in the
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the order denying
the motion to quash. This was denied in a memorandum decision; 68
and no appeal was taken from the subsequent conviction.
Inasmuch as the type of certiorari requested was not interlocutory
in equity under Rule 34 of the Supreme Court Rules of Practice, this
denial did not constitute an affirmance of the order below. 9 Since
the proceedings were criminal, however, and conviction was a prerequisite to appeal,7 0 the denial of the writ when sought, as here,
for the purpose of correcting an allegedly fundamental violation of
procedural due process is not without significance. 71 One would
normally expect the Supreme Court to take a firm stand against search
and seizure by an individual not empowered to serve a warrant at
66

State v. Club Diamond (C.C. 7th Fla., Aug. 26, 1948).
State v. Club Diamond (C.C. 7th Fla., Sept. 10, 1948).
68Club Diamond v. Sams, 39 So.2d 565 (Fla. 1948).
67

69

Cf. Davis v. Strople, 39 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1949).
F_ A. STAT. §924.06 (1949).
71
Since the arrest was made by the sheriff and the information was legally
sufficient, it is doubtful that a writ of habeas corpus would have been effective
to secure release.
70

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss2/3
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all under the circumstances. It follows that the elisor was in all
probability regarded as qualified.
III.

CONCLUSION

The appointment of elisors to serve civil process or to empanel
a jury is authorized by statute in federal procedure, in Florida, and
in thirty-eight other states; and the courts of these forty jurisdictions
have consistently upheld these statutes. On the criminal side, only
two state legislatures have expressly granted their courts the right
to appoint elisors for service of warrants, but none has expressly
denied its courts this right, and the Supreme Court of Florida has
refused to interfere with a circuit court appointment of an elisor to
serve a search warrant.
It seems inconceivable that our courts should be permitted to
appoint elisors as a means of maintaining judicial authority in mere
civil matters and yet be denied this essential emergency tool in
criminal matters. In Anglo-American communities the courts have
traditionally been the great barrier between lawlessness and order.
Proper service of warrants is essential to the performance of their
function.
M a general rule this service is adequately made by the sheriff.
On occasion, however, he is either half-hearted in his attempt to
serve the warrant or, particularly as regards a search warrant, he
serves it in collusion with the criminals sought for trial, with the
result that the essential evidence somehow never happens to be on
the premises at the precise moment of search. Under such circumstances the courts must have authority to obtain proper service by
conscientious elisors. When the sheriff attempts to paralyze the judicial
process itself, the judiciary, as guardian of the rights of the public
established by the law, has inherent power to effectuate the basic
requisites of the continued performance of its function under the
Constitution.
ROBERT F. NUNEZ
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